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Abstract:   There is a familiar problem in moral theories that recognize positive obligations to 
help others related to the practical room these obligations leave for ordinary life, and 
the risk that open-ended obligations to help others will consume our lives and 
resources. Responding to this problem, Kantians have tended to emphasize the idea 
of limits on positive obligations but are typically unsatisfactorily vague about the 
nature and extent of these limits.  I argue here that aspects of Kant’s discussion of 
duties of virtue owed to ourselves suggest a useful metric we can use in discussing 
these limits and that generalizing this account and combining it with elements of 
Barbara Herman’s view, offers us an attractive model of moral deliberation with the 
resources we need to engage the critic’s challenge properly. 
 
There is a familiar problem in moral theories that recognize positive obligations to help 
others related to the practical room that these obligations leave for ordinary life. Given the open-
ended nature of these commitments and the priority typically assigned to moral requirements, 
critics claim that obligations to aid will consume our time and efforts, threatening to reduce us to 
the status of “warehouses of potentially distributable skills and possessions” (Herman 2007, p. 
215) to be redistributed to the benefit of the less fortunate. This problem is immediately apparent 
in consequentialist theories committed to the simple maximization of impersonal good but also 
arises quickly in deontological views committed to some degree of positive aid in a world in 
which others are routinely in often very grave need.   
In Kantian ethics, discussions of this concern have tended to focus on the latitude associated 
with imperfect obligations said to be implied by Kant’s description of these as duties of "wide 
obligation" and by his remark that a "narrow" perfect duty is one that "admits of no exception in 
                                                          
1 © Copyright 2017 Donald Wilson 
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favor of inclination" (GW 4:421). Broadly speaking, two strategies emerge in response. Some 
commentators, notably Thomas E. Hill, interpret Kant's remarks to imply that wide imperfect 
duties do admit of such exceptions and argue that, while we have standing and serious 
obligations to render aid, we are nonetheless permitted to sometimes forgo opportunities to aid 
others merely because we happen to prefer to do something else. In contrast, commentators like 
Jens Timmermann and Barbara Herman argue that imperfect duties are "wide" only in the sense 
that they do not narrowly specify particular actions required in all circumstances. They deny that 
imperfect duties admit of exceptions on the basis of self-interest and argue, instead, that other 
grounds of obligation, including indirect obligations to promote our own happiness, set limits on 
our duties to aid others.  
What these different responses have in common is an emphasis on the form or structure of 
our obligations that tends to come at the expense of substantive discussion of actual limits and 
priorities. The problem with this is that the demandingness objection concerns the practical 
extent of our obligations not just their form and it is not enough merely to argue that obligations 
of aid admit of some limits. Commentators typically agree that the Kantian duty of beneficence 
imposes universally binding obligations of aid and remains a demanding commitment 
representing, as Hill puts it, "a major, serious, always potentially relevant moral consideration" 
(Hill 2002, p.203). An adequate response to the problem needs to address questions about the 
nature and practical implications of these limits directly and, however they are understood, we 
need some reason to be confident that Kantian ethics can strike a plausible balance between 
serious obligations to aid those in grave need and the importance of conscientious moral agents 
having room for a recognizably human life. 
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Given this concern, Barbara Herman’s response is distinctive. Like other commentators she 
focuses primarily on the structure of obligations to aid while also acknowledging the basic 
universality and seriousness of the obligation associated with Kantian beneficence, explicitly 
acknowledging that we have an “indeterminate obligation to all persons that bears on their need” 
(Herman 2007, p. 226) and agreeing that this general obligation can require us to respond to 
unmet needs both domestically and abroad. She also, however, directly addresses the question of 
practical scope, arguing that we are morally entitled to prioritize our own concerns and the 
interests of those we care about over even the dire needs of strangers and, strikingly, that that in 
doing so we need not think of ourselves as weighing or balancing the relative priorities of 
different moral considerations in deciding how to act.  
I think that problems with Herman’s account illustrate the limits of structural response like 
this. I argue that the changes in the way we understand our commitment to our own happiness 
and the organic model of moral development and deliberation she adopts do not suffice to 
dispense with the need for balancing competing interests and that the critic's problem cannot be 
solved without this kind of comparative weighing. I think, however, that elements of Herman’s 
account have much to offer and that other aspects of the same discussion of duties of virtue that 
she appeals to in developing her response suggest a useful metric we can use in weighing 
competing interests and priorities. I claim that Kant’s classification of the duties of virtue owed 
to ourselves in terms of different kinds of concerns with our moral health and moral prosperity 
suggests a natural way of understanding our moral priorities, and that generalizing this account 
and combining it with elements of Herman’s structural changes, offers us an attractive model of 
moral deliberation with the resources we need to engage the critic’s challenge properly. 
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 I 
At the center of Herman’s response is a distinctive account of the role of obligatory ends in 
moral life and of the connection between these ends and the natural end of one’s own happiness. 
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that the possibility of categorical moral requirements 
entails that some ends are given unconditionally as rational ends we ought to endorse and pursue 
(Kant, 1991, 6:385). He claims that these ends are our own perfection2 and the happiness of 
others, and associates these with various duties of virtue, including the duty of beneficence. In 
Chapter 9 of Moral Literacy, Herman suggests that these obligatory ends specify the material 
requirements of respect for rational nature in ourselves and others and serve as the ultimate 
measure of the choice worthiness of any of our other merely discretionary ends.3  
She argues that this obligatory concern with the end of our own perfection encompasses a 
broad range of concerns with the effectiveness of our moral agency, including concerns with our 
material well-being and our capacity to enjoy life more typically associated with the pursuit of 
happiness. She emphasizes that we come to maturity as moral agents through a complex 
development process and that our effective moral agency depends on a degree of material and 
psychological well-being. By requiring such concerns, Herman argues that a commitment to the 
obligatory end of our own perfection brings “own-happiness” directly “into the space of moral 
reasons,” (Herman 2007, p. 213) and that what may otherwise seem self-regarding concerns gain 
moral significance and may sometimes have priority over the interests, and even needs, of others.  
                                                          
2  The perfection of talents that serve to make us more effective agents and of the purity of our moral 
disposition (our capacity to listen to the requirements of reason and respond appropriately). 
3 This is not, she stresses, to suggest that we must always act directly in the service of one or other of 
these obligatory ends. As long as we are acting in ways that are consistent with the terms of this respect, 
our current ends are still answerable to these obligatory ends and we need not therefore always be 
acting directly for their sake. 
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Combining the organic model of moral deliberation she develops elsewhere4 with the idea of 
moral literacy that frames this later work, she stresses that we should think of these obligatory 
ends as naturally framing the mature moral agent’s deliberative field and already informing and 
animating her conception of her own happiness. She argues the developmental process our 
effective rational agency depends on begins with, and works through, the natural desire for our 
own happiness - “the vehicle that drives the development of human rational agency” (Herman 
2007, p. 216), by prompting us to reflect on what we want from life and how we may secure it. 
This evolving conception of our own happiness also develops, however, in the light of the basic 
moral literacy Herman thinks we inherit from our rational nature and therefore under the 
influence of a developing commitment to the obligatory ends of our own perfection and the 
happiness of others: 
... rationality is not an “add-on” to an independent, non-rational course of development. The 
fact that we are rational alters the desires we come to have: not just which objects we pursue, 
but the content and structure of the desires we act on” (Herman 2007, p. 193). 
These obligatory ends thus inform and animate the agent’s developing conception of her own 
happiness and come to frame the mature moral agent’s deliberative field and, in doing so, 
introduce “positive moral conditions on the pursuit of happiness” (Herman 2007, p. 213). Rather 
than thinking of ourselves as trying to balance the demands of reason against competing natural 
desires for our own happiness, we therefore think of our conception of happiness as evolving 
under the influence of, and being shaped by, fundamental and pervasive commitments to these 
                                                          
4  See, for example, “Making Room for Character” (Herman 2007, Chapter 1), and “Agency, Attachment 
& Difference” (Herman 1997, Chapter 9). 
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obligatory ends woven into the fabric of our lives and the way we understand ourselves and our 
projects.5  
As Herman understands it, the relationship between morality and own-happiness is therefore 
a complex one in which our own happiness is directly relevant from the moral point of view and 
our conception of our happiness evolves to reflect and incorporate our moral commitments at the 
same time as these commitments take on concerns we identify with our own happiness. In this 
context, Herman thinks of moral kindness as an interest developing organically as the natural 
expression of morally sanctioned concern we come to have for those we live with and care about: 
a concern that is, as such, already deeply connected with our conception of our own well-being. 
In this way, she thinks of moral kindness firstly as the natural expression of regard we have for 
our loved ones, friends, and those in our communities. She acknowledges that the obligation here 
still includes, and requires, concern with those who are distant from us, including those in dire 
need elsewhere in the world, but argues that it does not begin from the fact of abstract need and 
take this as the sole, or even the primary, measure of obligation.  
                                                          
5 As Andrews Reath notes, Herman’s account therefore moralizes happiness. Obligatory ends “transform 
natural desires into forms of valuing that are responsive to reasons” (Reath, p.10) shaping our evolving 
desires and in this way: 
We can come to take pleasure in forms of work, leisure activity or human relationships that 
provide occasions for rational development (broadly construed), and be indifferent to those 
that do not. The flourishing of others that we care about can become integral to our own 
well-being, and so on. (Reath, p.10) 
At the same time, however, morality is humanized and personalized by taking the things we care about 
and the interests and relationships we grow into seriously on their own terms. Herman stresses that we 
develop in response to our circumstances in particular communities and our interests and relationships 
and the conception of our own happiness we build around these reflect these communities and the 
choices that we make. Because these interests and relationships are also shaped by our commitment to 
the ends of our own perfection and the happiness of others, they can come to develop in appropriately 
reason responsive ways and thus to have a place on their own terms in a life shaped and informed by 
moral value. At the same time, however, these interests and relationships grow out of our particular 
circumstances and individual choices, reflecting the personal priorities, commitments, and relationships 
we have come to value as individuals and have a place in our lives on their own terms. 
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Reasoning in this way, Herman concludes that interests associated with own-happiness can 
have priority over the interests of others, and strikingly, that they can do so without our having to 
think of ourselves as weighing or balancing interests against each other: 
...the salutary effect of locating the argument for beneficence under an obligatory end is to 
transform the way concern for self is connected to concern for others so that judgment need not 
be about adjudicating between own- and others’-happiness by means of the weighing and 
balancing of kinds of interests and numbers of persons (Herman 2007, p. 219). 
II 
There is a great deal here that is helpful, but I do not think that Herman succeeds in avoiding 
the need for balancing or that it is possible for Kantians to do so. Initially, Herman’s response 
appears merely to shift the balancing required to one that takes place within morality, making 
own-happiness relevant from the moral point of view and requiring us to weigh considerations of 
own-happiness against different moral considerations owed to others.  She seems, however, to 
also distance her view from this kind of balancing. Having argued that the obligatory end of 
one’s own perfection imposes limits on our obligations to promote the well-being of others 
permitting us to sometimes prefer our own interests, she claims it is nonetheless a mistake to 
object that “one must resort to some sort of balancing after all,” and that doing so “misses the 
point” of the structural change she proposes (Herman 2007, p. 218).    
She gives two reasons for this claim, neither of which seems to support it. She argues that 
weighing is inappropriate because some goods are essential to the effectiveness of our agency 
suggesting, for example, that: 
If education is a necessity in some context for effective agency, then it (or the wherewithal to 
support it) is not available for distribution to others. Whether one may sacrifice such a 
resource for the sake of others is not, then entirely discretionary (Herman 2007, p. 218).   
Returning to the same theme in discussing the latitude associated with imperfect duties, she 
emphasizes that the concern with our own perfection is not meant to simply shift an abstract 
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moral balance to be struck between our own pursuits and the interests of others in favor of the 
former and that decisions here will require, instead, circumstance specific individual judgement. 
She stresses that a concern with the effectiveness of moral agency makes the pursuit of happiness 
morally significant but does not thereby specify any uniquely proper concept of happiness (“as if 
the determination of what makes my life go well were to be made impersonally,” Herman 2007, 
p. 218). What matters is that I be able to learn and grow from my own experiences, developing 
the skills and understanding essential to my effective moral agency, and that I be reasonably 
content with my life in a way that allows me to be connected with it and engaged by moral 
concerns. Within limits, how I choose to do this is up to me and we cannot therefore specify in 
advance the content of our imperfect duties. Instead decisions we make concerning the pursuit of 
our own happiness and our obligations to help others will require individual judgement in 
particular situations reflecting the specific interests and relationships individuals form and invest 
themselves in rather than the application of any general balancing rule or metric6.  
The problem is that neither the appeal to necessity nor the emphasis on individual judgement 
obviates the need to deliberate about how to act and decide between different concerns. We may 
agree that goods like a basic education are necessary for effective moral agency, but we can 
presumably make analogous claims of necessity on behalf of the essential needs of others and 
will therefore still find ourselves in the situation of having to adjudicate between competing 
claims, in this case to necessary goods associated with our different obligatory ends.  Indeed, 
Herman stresses that the special status afforded to the pursuit of our own happiness on the basis 
of connections between own-happiness and rational functioning applies equally to the happiness 
                                                          
6 Herman suggests that the latitude associated with imperfect duties is to be found in this space left for 
choices about how we want to live (rather than in the idea that these obligations sometimes allow for 
exceptions in the name of self-interest). 
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of others. We can therefore presumably make equally compelling claims of necessity on behalf 
of similarly basic needs essential to other’s agency and happiness. These claims will also come 
in different degrees with different levels of urgency and we cannot view ourselves as simply 
entitled to prioritize our own needs. We cannot therefore avoid the questions we confront here 
without a great deal more discussion and, it seems, without weighing the character and relative 
importance and priority of even essential goods.  
Similarly, while we may well think of obligations to help others as being affected by our 
relationships, the kind of circumstance specific individual reflection and judgement that Herman 
emphasizes will still involve choices about whose interests to prioritize and pursue. The 
reflective and morally engaged Kantian cannot just take the relationships they find themselves in 
and the commitments these entail for granted and simply assume they have priority in their moral 
life. Given limited time and resources, we will routinely have to choose between doing 
something we enjoy or helping people we care about and giving aid to strangers who are poor 
and less fortunate. The choices we must make here are at the heart of the problem and 
emphasizing individual variation and the importance of place and time again does not affect the 
basic dynamic of the problem: we still confront the need to prioritize moral commitments and 
cannot, it seems, defend the priority of personal interests without engaging in the kind of 
comparative judgements that Herman seems concerned to distance herself from. 
Notice also that this is true even if we think of the obligation to meet the basic needs of 
strangers as primarily a matter of justice. Here, and in her later work on gratitude, Herman 
stresses the systematization of our moral obligations and the role of justice in meeting essential 
needs. She also, however, explicitly accepts that we can inherit “secondary obligations” of 
beneficence owed towards distant others whose needs have not been met by the institutions 
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primarily responsible for their care and therefore considers whether people living in the more 
affluent developed world are obligated to provide aid to people in desperate need in other parts 
of the world. Given the routine and continuing failure of domestic and international institutions 
of justice to care for the very poor, this kind of case is the usual focus in discussions of the 
background questions here about the decency of our lives and the practical extent of our 
obligations to help others and Herman’s response is striking but inconclusive. Although she 
treats the obligation to provide aid in these cases as one belonging in the first instance to the 
domestic government in place, she accepts that we can inherit potentially very extensive 
obligations to aid through our obligatory commitment to the end of others’ happiness and the 
“indeterminate obligation to all persons” associated with this commitment (Herman, 2007, p. 
226).  She treats these inherited obligations, however, as “secondary,” and claims that they must 
“fit” with domestic “primary” obligations of beneficence arising from our commitments within 
our own communities and “with our morally required concern for ourselves,” suggesting that: 
For this reason, not only will the general duty to others be limited, in order to meet our 
primary duties of beneficence, we may also be required to expend resources on higher-
function needs close to us rather than on more basic needs at a distance (Herman, 2007, 
p. 227).  
Without some further discussion of the relative priorities here it is not, however, clear why “fit” 
must be in this direction. Assume that we are both subject to a general obligation to help others 
and that you have incurred, in addition, a special obligation to support someone else (because, 
say, you promised to do so). Imagine now that you are unable or unwilling to meet your 
obligations to this person and that it falls on me to do so. It is not clear why we should think of 
my obligation here as an “inherited” and “secondary” obligation subordinate to whatever prior 
commitments I happen to have. This is surely a question of the relative priorities of the interests 
at stake and, while it is true that the additional burden on me needs to “fit” with my other 
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obligations, we cannot simply assume that “fit” means “comes after.” Indeed, it is precisely this 
question of fit that is at the heart of concerns about the decency of our lives and the scope of our 
obligations to help others. 
The critic concerned with demandingness will therefore simply argue that moralizing own-
happiness and emphasizing the importance of situational judgement merely shifts the conflict to 
one within morality and personalizes it without actually addressing the central concern with 
marginalization. They will be similarly skeptical about Herman’s emphasis on the importance of 
moral culture and the organic development of moral commitment. Stressing that Kantian moral 
agents act deliberately with some understanding of the moral character of their choices and are 
committed to the equal status of all persons, they will argue that we cannot take for granted the 
norms we inherit and the relationships and commitments we grow into.  From the critic’s point 
of view, we need to be able to reflectively endorse the personal interests and relationships we 
care about and to argue, not just that these concerns count from the moral point of view, but that 
they count enough to have priority in a range of key cases over the routinely extensive needs and 
interests of more distant others. This cannot be accomplished without some articulated account 
of the relative priorities to be afforded to different needs and interests of persons in different 
circumstances and relationships, and therefore without engaging in the kind of weighing and 
balancing Herman seems concerned to forgo.   
III 
While I think that Herman is right to think of own-happiness as having moral value and that 
her organic model of moral development and deliberation is a promising one, I therefore also 
think that her account illustrates the limits of structural responses to this problem. An adequate 
response to the demandingness objection must address the issue of practical limits and priorities 
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more directly and cannot avoid the need to weigh competing claims on our times and resources 
that is at the heart of the concern here. I think, however, that other aspects of Kant’s discussion 
of obligatory ends and duties of virtue suggest a natural way of understanding our priorities 
oriented around the same kinds of concerns with own-happiness that Herman stresses. I think 
that combining this account with elements of Herman’s model of moral deliberation and her 
emphasis on individual specific circumstances offers us an account of the limits of obligations to 
help others with the resources we need to engage the issues here.  
Having identified the obligatory ends of our own perfection and the happiness of others, Kant 
goes on to classify various different duties of virtue around these commitments. In the case of 
duties of virtue owed to ourselves, he distinguishes between (negative and formal) perfect duties 
associated with concerns with our moral health and (positive and material) imperfect duties 
concerned with moral prosperity (MS 6:419).7 Duties concerned with ensuring moral health 
require respect for the necessary conditions of the possibility of moral agency in human beings 
and prohibit actions like drunkenness that compromise our basic capacity to govern ourselves on 
the basis of reason rather than self-love (our capacity for “inner freedom”). These duties are then 
contrasted with imperfect duties oriented around concerns with ensuring our moral prosperity or 
flourishing, focused, more positively, on respect for conditions necessary for the effective 
exercise of rational agency in choice and action.   
                                                          
7  Kant contrasts formal and perfect duties concerned with our “moral self-preservation” with positive and 
imperfect duties concerned with our “perfecting” ourselves and suggests that: 
The first belong to the moral health (ad esse) of a human being as object of both his outer 
sense and his inner sense, to the preservation of his nature in its perfection (as receptivity). 
The second belong to his moral prosperity (ad melius esse, opulentia moralis), which 
consists in possessing a capacity sufficient for all his ends, insofar as this can be acquired; 
they belong to his cultivation (active perfecting) of himself (MS, 6:419). 
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In the case of perfect duties of virtue owed to ourselves, Kant distinguishes between duties 
prohibiting vices like drunkenness and suicide owed to ourselves "as animal and moral beings" 
concerned with our general capacity to use our powers purposively in choice and action and 
those owed to ourselves as “moral beings only,” concerned more directly with our capacity to 
exercise specifically rational self-control. Given our natural tendency to be powerfully 
influenced by our desires, Kant thinks that the possibility of rational self-constraint in human 
beings depends on vigilance and strength of will and describes “the state of health in the moral 
life” as one requiring the possession of a “tranquil mind” capable of deliberating properly free 
from undue influence by affects, passions, and strong desires, together with a “considered and 
firm resolve to put the law of virtue into practice” (MS, 6:409). The various vices contrary to 
duties owed to ourselves as moral beings only that Kant discusses then reflect concerns with the 
necessary conditions of this kind of tranquil mind and personal resolve.  
These duties encompass exactly the kind of concerns with the psychological dynamics of 
human agency that Herman emphasizes.8 So, for example, Kant associates a perfect duty 
prohibiting miserly avarice with concerns with our moral health, describing the relevant vice in 
terms of a “slavish subjection of oneself to the goods that contribute to happiness” (MS, 6:434) 
and contrasting it with greedy avarice violating duties of beneficence owed to others. Earlier he 
notes that “adversity, pain and want are great temptations to violate one's duty” (MS, 6:388), 
and, that while “to seek prosperity for its own sake is not directly a duty,” “indirectly it can well 
be a duty, that of warding off poverty insofar as this is a great temptation to vice” (one whose 
                                                          
8  For a more comprehensive discussion of Kant’s treatment of these duties see Wilson 2007. I argue here 
that all of the various duties of virtue that Kant discusses in the Metaphysics of Morals, including duties 
of respect and love owed to others, should be regarded as oriented around concerns with ensuring our 
capacity for moral agency, and that this suggests an attractive and subtle account encompassing a range 
of psychological and social concerns. 
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end is “not my happiness but the preservation of my moral integrity” (MS, 6:389). Echoing the 
same theme he argues that miserly avarice restricts “one’s own enjoyment of the means to good 
living so narrowly as to leave one’s own true needs unsatisfied” (MS, 6:432) thereby “depriving 
oneself of the comforts necessary to enjoy life” (MS, 6:433). The picture developed here and in 
Kant's discussion of the same vice in his Lectures on Ethics is then one of a psychologically 
dysfunctional life of damaging self-deprivation oriented around the continual acquisition and 
obsessive hoarding of goods whose proper value lies in their use as means to the end of 
enjoyment. A life of “slavish subjection” to material goods in which all the agent’s decisions are 
weighed in terms of this overarching goal and in which their capacity to reason about how they 
ought to act is profoundly compromised.9 
Importantly, however, the contrast here between perfect duties requiring respect for 
necessary conditions of the possibility of moral agency and imperfect obligations oriented 
around concerns with the effective exercise of this agency also suggests a way of distinguishing 
between different moral concerns and understanding the limits of special consideration afforded 
to our own interests and happiness. Given this contrast, it seems reasonable to suggest that in 
respecting our own moral natures we ought to give priority to the former in cases where we have 
to choose. So, for example, given the need for us to develop the core skill sets essential to the 
realization of our moral nature and the possible psychological importance of being able to pursue 
                                                          
9  In the Lectures on Ethics, Kant suggests that miserly avarice often begins with a reasonable effort at 
prudent resource management that is distorted over time eventually becoming a kind of mania for 
possession that causes us to lose touch with the proper value of possessions as means to other ends. The 
miser gradually reduces his life to one oriented solely around the empty hoarding of material goods, 
becoming obsessively concerned with keeping what he has and increasing his stock. Approaching all 
his decisions with these overriding interests to the fore, he forgoes the normal range of social pleasures 
and finds himself, instead, always “occupied with anxious cares” about his possessions (LE, 27:401) 
that come to pervade his choices and dominate his life. 
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particular educational interests central to one's sense of self, an interest in securing some 
educational opportunities can reasonably be regarded as relevantly connected with concerns with 
moral health. Similarly, given the dependence of our capacity for rational self-control on our 
general psychological health, the required concern with conditions of moral health will readily 
encompass key concerns with our ability to develop and sustain the kind of close personal 
relationships and core commitments ordinarily essential to human well-being and necessary if we 
are to be able to identify with our lives and care about how we live and what we do. Viewed in 
this way, it is plausible to suggest that in thinking about how we ought to live interests like these 
connected with concerns with our moral health and essential to our capacity for moral agency 
should have priority over concerns with the general perfection of our talents and the pursuit of 
less central interests of own-happiness connected with considerations of moral prosperity. 
While it will be generally up to the agent to decide for herself which relationships and 
interests are central to her, the classification of these duties in terms of the idea of concerns with 
moral health and moral prosperity will also serve to inform the nature and limits of any special 
consideration afforded to them on these grounds. So, for example, conscientious moral agents 
considering prioritizing opportunities that go beyond the basic education necessary to equip them 
to understand their obligations and manage their affairs need to sincerely regard these 
opportunities as central to their sense of self and well-being and, even then, will be expected to 
consider the relative costs of their pursuit. Reflecting in this way, they may find themselves 
required to concede that the opportunity in question cannot reasonably be regarded as a 
privileged interest connected with conditions of their agency. Even when the case for this kind of 
priority can be made, concerns related to our moral health will take different forms, some will be 
more urgent and less malleable than others and we could still sometimes be required to postpone 
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or modify our interests if the present costs of their pursuit are too high. So, for example, 
responsible moral agents committed to respect for the conditions of their own agency will have 
reason to prioritize immediate and more urgent needs for basic welfare over longer term 
educational needs and to sometimes adjust even core interests in an effort to render them more 
compatible with their other commitments. 
The division of duties into duties concerned with necessary conditions of moral agency and 
those concerned with the effective exercise of this agency thus offers an important refinement to 
Herman's broader notion of general conditions of effective agency, one that allows us to 
discriminate between interests and to understand the special moral priority attaching to some 
interests.  I propose that we generalize this understanding of concerns with agency and use the 
distinction between concerns with agents’ moral health and their moral prosperity to inform the 
broader weighing of interests that seems to be required.  
As Herman stresses, the object of duties of beneficence owed to others is not their well-being 
per se but rather their agency: 
Neither the satisfaction of desire per se nor the promotion of any arbitrary conception of 
happiness could obligate us. If [others’] well-being matters, it will be because of its 
connection with the core value of rational agency (Herman, 2007, p. 215). 
I suggest, therefore, that we think of the requirement to respect others’ agency associated with 
the obligation to make their happiness our end as being similarly divided into perfect obligations 
concerned with conditions of the possibility of moral agency and imperfect obligations 
concerned with its effective exercise. Doing so, and recognizing the priority attaching to 
concerns with conditions of moral health, affords us a way of better understanding the nature and 
limits of our obligations to others and promises the kind of resources we need if we are to 
adequately respond to the critic’s challenge.  
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I propose, then, that we distinguish between perfect obligations requiring respect for 
necessary conditions of moral health that prohibit indifference to the essential conditions of 
others’ moral agency and imperfect obligations requiring us to actively further others’ moral 
prosperity (either directly by helping them in their pursuit of moral ends or indirectly by 
promoting their happiness and enriching their lives in ways that make moral commitment 
generally easier to develop and sustain).10 Viewed in this way, the priorities required of us in 
simpler cases are relatively straightforward. Just as it seems plausible to claim that respect for 
our own moral agency requires us to prioritize concerns with necessary conditions of this agency 
over its perfection and the pursuit of other less central ends that serve merely to enrich our lives, 
it seems reasonable to claim that the same is true when we have to choose between these 
concerns and agency or happiness promoting interests of others. So, for example, just as the 
priority attaching to concerns with moral health suggests that I should not compromise key 
relationships in my life integral to my psychological health in order to further refine useful 
practical skills, I should similarly not do so in order to promote the ends of others in ways that 
might enrich their lives and contribute positively to their moral prosperity instead. Viewed in this 
way, we are therefore ordinarily entitled to favor the causes, projects, and relationships around 
which we build our lives over the discretionary interests of others in our communities and more 
                                                          
10 Treating a requirement to provide for others’ essential agency sustaining needs as a perfect duty 
represents a departure from the standard account of these duties as “negative” and “formal” obligations. 
Kant warns us in the Groundwork, however, that he is not committed to this standard model and departs 
significantly from it in describing perfect duties of virtue owed to ourselves in The Metaphysics of 
Morals as duties requiring the adoption of the end of our own perfection and as enjoining a range of 
positive commitments to virtues like honest self-reflection and proper self-respect and to other 
conditions necessary if we are to sustain our basic capacity for moral agency. More generally, even 
more standard examples of negative perfect duties implicitly have positive aspects - the duty prohibiting 
false promises, for example, is met only by keeping our promises and doing whatever we have 
undertaken to do – again suggesting that it is an oversimplification to think of these duties as defined 
narrowly by omission. For a more comprehensive discussion of the account I propose and what it 
suggests about the interpretation of some key formal elements of Kant’s view, see Wilson, 2004. 
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distant strangers. By the same token, however, we must also be willing to sacrifice discretionary 
interests and projects of our own for the sake of considerations bearing on the moral health of 
others. We can reasonably claim some interests and key relationships are entitled to priority but 
the sincere Kantian cannot view this as a “blank check.” They should be willing to reflect 
critically on their interests and priorities and recognize that many of these serve merely to enrich 
their lives and should be viewed as things they can reasonably be expected to sacrifice for the 
sake of more basic agency sustaining needs of others.  
Harder choices will also have to be made in cases where we must decide between concerns 
with our own and others’ moral health. In thinking of my family or core interests as having 
priority on the grounds of concerns with my moral health I commit myself to attaching the same 
priority to similarly necessary conditions of others’ moral agency. Just as respect for the 
necessary conditions of our own moral health commits us to prioritizing our immediate agency 
sustaining needs over more flexible longer term needs, it will therefore similarly require that we 
prioritize the urgent needs of others over our own less pressing needs.  Thus understood, I should 
think of myself as required to prioritize others’ immediate needs for basic food or shelter over 
educational or other core commitments which I build my life around but which I can reasonably 
postpone or pursue incrementally in the longer term without significant loss. We will, however, 
also have to be mindful here of other obligations we have and to think carefully about the form 
of aid we offer. We do not realize our moral nature in acting in conformity with rational 
principles merely instrumentally in pursuit of some other goal or because we are moved to do so 
by custom or habit or by affects like fear, sympathy, love, etc.. We realize this nature, instead, 
only in conscious self-constraint reflecting a general commitment to prioritizing the requirements 
of reason over our other interests and must be free to make this commitment for ourselves, and to 
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develop the understanding and strength of character necessary to do so and to sustain it over 
time. Among other things, this will require that we be properly nurtured and protected as 
children in our early development and that when we reach maturity we have the freedom to 
decide for ourselves how we are to live and the space in which to learn to manage our own 
affairs. Concerns with respect for the conditions of our own and others’ moral health will 
therefore also emphasize the importance of special obligations owed to children and a broad 
range of robust concerns with our general freedoms and our capacity for independent judgement. 
These and other similar considerations will then be reflected in the choices we make here about 
how to help others and will require us, for example, to avoid forms of aid likely to create harmful 
relations of dependence in which beneficiaries may see themselves as bound by, or beholden to, 
the wills of their benefactors.11    
Importantly, however, the Kantian is not in the position of a utilitarian required to impartially 
survey the landscape of options and neutrally aim at the best outcome. The duties required here 
are principled obligations based on the formal moral requirement of respect for rational nature as 
this applies in the case of human agents who realize their rational nature only through the 
development and exercise of their capacity for inner freedom. Thinking of a realized capacity for 
inner freedom as the empirical form of rational nature in human beings, the suggestion is that in 
                                                          
11 For a more comprehensive discussion of the form that respect for others’ moral agency will take see 
[Wilson 2007, 2015]. I argue here that the relevant concerns with others’ moral agency will require 
consideration of a broad range of material and social circumstances and psychological factors bearing 
on the capacity of others to order and control their lives in general and to realize their moral natures for 
themselves. These will include both concerns with adverse conditions incompatible with the 
development and realization of our moral agency and with those positively conducive to it. So, for 
example, the required concerns will commit us to basic norms of non-interference and to the kind of 
social world respectful of others’ external freedom that Kant describes in the Doctrine of Right. More 
positively, however, these concerns will also include a broader range of norms enjoining an active 
sensitivity to the efforts of others to organize and control their own lives requiring us to aid them in the 
pursuit of permissible discretionary ends and to play our part in ensuring a public culture respectful of 
different choices and supportive of others' efforts to realize their moral natures for themselves. 
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our case the formal moral requirement of respect for the unconditioned value of rational agency 
takes the form of a requirement of respect for the conditions under which this freedom is possible 
and can flourish. To understand what this requires, we must take into account various facts about 
us that bear on our own and others’ capacities for inner freedom, including facts about our basic 
needs and vulnerabilities and about the dependence of our moral agency on our psychological 
health. Doing so does not, however, commit us to thinking of a concern with this kind of 
freedom as a goal to be promoted. Nor is there any suggestion that the wrong here is contingent 
on the likelihood of actual harm to agency. What is required of us is that we act on maxims that 
express due respect for our own and others’ rational natures. The relevant harms associated with 
concerns with moral health and moral prosperity serve to characterize the form of different 
wrongs but we act wrongly to the extent that our choices of maxims fail to express this proper 
respect whether or not our actions have the relevant bad consequences. 
The weighing of interests required of the Kantian is not therefore the kind of simple 
aggregation of commensurable goods associated with the utilitarian model. The fact that I could 
protect more or greater agency by sacrificing central interests of my own is not decisive. Nor do 
the relevant Kantian concerns with necessary conditions of agency come with different 
commensurable weights attached to them. To the extent that it is reasonable to claim that 
interests like my relationship with my children are integral to my sense of self and moral agency, 
the actions necessary to secure these interests have a legitimate claim to moral priority on an 
equal footing with the agency sustaining claims of others. The fact that a stranger is starving 
therefore does not itself give them a greater claim to my time and resources than, say, my 
children have. Nor does the fact that I might be able to save ten strangers by sacrificing my 
children’s interests.  Instead, the sincere Kantian committed to respect for the necessary 
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conditions of their own and others’ moral health and prosperity will think of herself as bound by 
principled norms appropriate for a community committed to respect for the general conditions 
under which moral agency is possible for human agents and can flourish in human communities. 
These norms will require us to prioritize agency sustaining needs over interests that serve to 
enrich life connected with our moral prosperity and, in situations where we must choose between 
different concerns with moral health, to put more urgent needs ahead of those that can be 
postponed. In doing so, they will also require us to think carefully about other obligations we 
may have in particular cases and about the form of aid we offer, but they do not simply require 
us to abandon our own core commitments in the pursuit of more optimal outcomes.  
Notice also that we should not think of the kind of weighing of interests required here as a 
matter of explicit deliberation demanding constant moral evaluation of our relationships and 
commitments in the moment of choice. Relationships with our loved ones and commitments to 
defining ideals and projects are importantly constituted by, and dependent on, partiality and 
priority. We must be free to act directly from motives like these and they must be understood to 
have a place in our lives on their own terms. The suggestion here is not, then, that we are to 
constantly weigh the permissibility of actions that support these relationships and interests in the 
moment and act on them always only through the lens of impartial moral commitment. Instead, 
we should think of this kind of weighing as ordinarily taking place “behind the scenes” in 
moments of background critical moral reflection and deliberation. Committed to respect for the 
general conditions of moral health and prosperity, the sincere Kantian will seek to structure her 
life around the relevant norms and priorities, taking into account the need for human beings to 
develop a mature understanding of their own good and the dependence of our agency on a broad 
range of needs and interests, including those connected with our psychological health. Embedded 
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in her deliberative field, the priorities this commitment requires will come to color and shape the 
other interests she comes to have in the manner Herman envisages which will thus be valued 
independently on their own grounds at the same time as they are responsive to moral value. Thus 
understood, my love for my children evolves organically in the context of my life but does so in 
a way that is responsive to moral requirements and answerable to my background commitment to 
respect for the conditions of my own and others’ moral health and prosperity. My relationships 
with those I love are then already informed by these commitments and, barring unusual 
circumstances, there is no expectation that I self-consciously weigh my options in the moment of 
action in my day-to-day conduct towards those I love.12  
There is also no reason to think of the weighing required here as an algorithmic calculation 
permitting no variation in judgement or flexibility in different circumstances. Differences in 
culture and circumstances will mean that different agents can reasonably think of different 
interests as relevantly connected with concerns with moral health. So, for example, the way that 
personal and family relationships are understood will partly be a matter of culture and claims 
made on this basis may therefore vary. Different communities will think of the relationship 
                                                          
12 Viewed in this way I can think of personal relationships formed in the ordinary conduct of my life as 
having appropriately direct non-moral value for me at the same time as I understand their place in the 
broader context of my moral life in terms of this direct and deeply partial value and its central role in 
the psychological integrity of normal human beings. In ordinary contexts, when asked by my spouse or 
children why I do things for them, I am not required to adopt the lofty and impartial perspective of 
morality – I can answer directly, and in perfectly good faith, that I do these things because I love them. 
At the same time, however, I understand that love has its limits, and, when asked in another context to 
defend my partiality as morally permissible, I can do so. Thus, when asked by my son to justify my 
preference for him over strangers, I can explain that relationships like ours are part of the deepest fabric 
of a human life and serve to define us and to connect us with our lives and with others. Responding in 
this way, I argue that within limits people are entitled to show special preferences for significant others, 
and that my deep and personal affection for him falls under the auspices of this kind of moral 
consideration.  Far from devaluing my personal attachment, the fact that I can also justify personal 
commitment to him from my moral point of view seems only to add to its significance and value. For a 
longer discussion of the structure of these interests and the related concern with alienation, see Wilson 
2009. 
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between children and aging parents or distant members of extended families differently and this 
will create different expectations to be met in these relationships which we will be entitled to 
consider prioritizing. The level of development and sophistication of a society will also affect 
which interests can reasonably be prioritized. So, for example, computer literacy, and familiarity 
with, and access to, the internet and to social media are increasingly becoming basic 
prerequisites integral to one’s prospects in life in more affluent developed societies. 
Technologies like these are also things that people increasingly have to understand and utilize in 
order to properly appreciate and be responsive to developing moral concerns in modern societies. 
In some circumstances, then, education about, and access to, resources and goods like these 
could therefore reasonably be seen as connected with the kind of key interests and basic moral 
competencies associated with concerns with moral health rather than just as things that enrich 
our lives but which we can clearly be expected to do without.  
We can also acknowledge the differences arising from the personal choices that individuals 
make about how to live. Within some limits, the non-moral interests I come to care about and the 
number and nature of the relationships I build my life around are a matter of personal choice. 
One person may choose to build their life around their passion for history while another finds 
meaning in fostering multiple connections and relationships with friends and people in their 
communities. To the extent that both of them see these commitments as integral to their sense of 
self they will be entitled to think of them as having priority in their moral lives. Likewise, what 
my family asks of me will not be the same as what someone else’s family needs. There are, 
however, limits here. Not everything that those of us fortunate enough to live in the developed 
world have come to take for granted can reasonably be said to be essential to our moral agency 
and we will need to be careful here to avoid misrepresenting luxuries as essentials. Likewise, 
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while it is reasonable to say that personal relationships and core commitments play a central role 
in the integrity of our moral agency and that we are therefore entitled to act in ways necessary to 
support and sustain these relationships, relationships and interests like these can also cause us to 
neglect obligations to others and can become distorted and exaggerated in obsession and other 
destructive pathologies. Moreover, some relationships and interests that people choose to build 
their lives around are simply incompatible with respect for the conditions of their own and 
others’ moral health and will have no legitimate claim to priority here. We cannot therefore just 
take the interests we find ourselves having grown into for granted and view them as privileged 
merely because we find ourselves attached to them. We must be willing, instead, to use our 
judgement to reflect critically on the particular nature of the relationships and interests we invest 
ourselves in and to revise these if we have reason to think they are problematic.  
Notice also that clear lines here will routinely elude us and that agents will have reason to 
focus on overall priorities and strategies rather than individual choices in deciding how to 
organize their lives along these lines. After a stressful year I may reasonably be able to claim that 
I need a vacation in order to recuperate and reconnect with the important people in my life. There 
is an obvious difference, however, between a family trip to Hawaii for a week or two and a six 
month round-the-world tour of famous Michelin star restaurants. Sincere agents committed to 
respect for the conditions of moral health in a world of significant need ought to have serious 
difficultly representing the latter as something essential to their continued psychological health 
and, to the extent that they can do so in good faith, ought to consider weaning themselves off 
such unreasonably expensive tastes over time. Short of extremes like this, however, there is no 
formula here that we can use in order to determine whether any particular vacation is warranted 
and an obsessive preoccupation with this question encouraging constant reevaluation and 
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assessment of the choice of one’s vacation would only undermine the value of taking it. Similar 
issues will arise when it comes to thinking about the relative priorities of different concerns and 
the proper limits of postponing our own needs. On the one hand, confronted with someone in 
grave need of food or shelter, it will always seem reasonable to suggest that I can postpone my 
vacation or delay buying my son the present he is anxiously anticipating in order to meet this 
more urgent need, on the other, continued postponement will eventually come at the cost one’s 
own core commitments.  
Mature moral agents will understand the importance of this indeterminacy. They will 
recognize the need to use judgement in deciding how to reconcile conflicting priorities and when 
they can put their own needs first but will also understand that if they confine themselves to 
confronting this choice each time in isolation they will risk underestimating the costs to 
themselves. Appreciating this, they will see themselves as having reason to take a longer view. 
So, for example, if I know that there is a large amount of unmet basic need likely to persist into 
the future, the appropriate response on my part will not be to keep trying to meet individual 
needs as I encounter them continually postponing my own. Instead, I will see myself as having 
reason to think more strategically and to try to find alternatives that strike a better balance, 
perhaps by committing myself to giving more modestly in the short term without harmfully 
postponing my own needs while also working seriously for longer term social and political 
change aimed at addressing these concerns on a broader scale.13  
                                                          
13 A focus on political and institutional change will also be suggested by familiar practical considerations 
relating to the nature and scope of the problems to be addressed. 
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III 
The kind of weighing of interests I propose is not, therefore, a matter of constant self-
evaluation in the moment of choice. Nor does it commit us to the aggregation and maximization 
of goods or to the crude application of a general formula indifferent to variations in 
circumstances. The Kantian agent is, however, still relevantly committed to weighing moral 
interests associated with their pursuit of their own happiness and using their judgement to 
balance these interests against broader moral commitments in deciding how to live. Sincere 
Kantians will be expected to devote time to critical reflection on their various relationships and 
commitments and the interests of own-happiness they make room for in their lives and must be 
able to see these relationships and interests as compatible overall with their broader moral 
commitment to respect for the general conditions of moral health and moral prosperity in human 
beings. To this end, they will be expected to consider the nature and costs of their defining 
commitments and their relative urgency, and, more generally, to be willing to critically evaluate 
these commitments and to try to distinguish those that serve merely to enrich their lives from 
those that they sincerely regard as defining of their sense of self and essential to their continuing 
engagement with their lives. In doing so, the Kantian will have to use her judgement in ongoing 
critical reflection on the nature of her own and others’ needs and interests. Barring unusual 
circumstances, she will not be required to be able to defend the immediate priority of individual 
choices she makes but she will be expected to think carefully about the role particular 
relationships or interests play in her life and the overall costs of maintaining these. Reasoning in 
this way, she may find herself forced to concede that a relationship she is involved with is 
problematic or that some interest she has always thought of as important is, on reflection, one she 
can postpone or do without. Alternatively, she may find herself having to conclude that she 
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should try to reduce her dependence on some inappropriate or very expensive core commitment 
over time.  
There is no doubt that this model will be more demanding than Herman seems willing to 
endorse or than we presently seem comfortable with giving. I can justify the priority I attach to 
special relationships and core interests in my life here only if the choices I make and the 
priorities I structure my life around reflect a similar and equal commitment to the necessary 
conditions of others’ moral health. In the world we live in, this will impose very significant 
demands on the time and energies of those of us fortunate enough to live even reasonably well in 
the developed nations. There is therefore no reason to expect any sense of comfort or closure 
from this account. In our world of widespread and persistent need, sincere individuals trying to 
help in isolation face a daunting and seemingly relentless task and will have to think carefully 
about how to help in these circumstances if they are to avoid simply sinking into debilitating 
despair. They should recognize that they ought not to have to bear this burden alone and that they 
have moral and practical reasons to prioritize efforts at ensuring collective action and must be 
mindful of the importance of leaving room for some enjoyment of their lives.  
For most of us, however, the discomfort occasioned by reflection on our obligations to help 
others will have a different, and far less ennobling, source. Most of us engage in this kind of 
critical self-reflection only uncomfortably and haphazardly and we are adept at finding ways to 
shy away from the conclusions it suggests. Kant thinks of us as being powerfully moved by our 
desires and given to complacency and self-deception in critical self-examination and this is, I 
think, a failing too often on display in this context. We find it easy to rationalize the pursuit of 
our own interests and relationships and are good at finding excuses allowing us to pass up or 
postpone opportunities to help others. To different degrees, this tendency is, I think, common 
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even in otherwise reasonably conscientious moral agents and is manifested in a lingering sense 
of discomfort or guilt whenever we are more vividly confronted with the plight of others. That 
we have difficulty living up to it, does not, however, make an account too demanding and there 
is a very great deal more that most of us could easily do without approaching the point of 
significant sacrifice. The demands imposed here are not unlimited and the limits suggested, are I 
think, in line with the basic character of Kantian ethics and the universal and overriding 
commitments it imposes.  
Though not a matter of weighing in the sense of a definitive algorithmic calculation of 
priorities, I take it that some form of comparative weighing like this is essential if we are to 
adequately meet the critic’s challenge. I think Herman is right to stress the moral importance of 
own-happiness and the connection between core relationships and interests and our capacity for 
moral agency. I also think she is right to reject the schizophrenia that treats agents’ moral 
interests as distinct from their personal interests and, instead, to moralize happiness on the one 
hand and humanize moral commitment on the other. The critic’s concern here is, however, 
ultimately not one with the form of moral commitment, it is a concern with the practical extent 
of different commitments and the questions raised cannot be adequately addressed merely by 
structural changes in the way moral obligation and moral life are understood. I think that the 
account I propose offers us the resources we need to engage the questions that arise here and an 
attractive model of the kind of reasoning involved.    
Donald Wilson 
Kansas State University 
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